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Spatially Selective Artificial-Noise Aided
Transmit Optimization for MISO Multi-Eves
Secrecy Rate Maximization
Qiang Li† and Wing-Kin Ma‡
Abstract
Consider an MISO channel overheard by multiple eavesdroppers. Our goal is to design an artificial
noise (AN)-aided transmit strategy, such that the achievable secrecy rate is maximized subject to the sum
power constraint. AN-aided secure transmission has recently been found to be a promising approach
for blocking eavesdropping attempts. In many existing studies, the confidential information transmit
covariance and the AN covariance are not simultaneously optimized. In particular, for design convenience,
it is common to prefix the AN covariance as a specific kind of spatially isotropic covariance. This paper
considers joint optimization of the transmit and AN covariances for secrecy rate maximization (SRM),
with a design flexibility that the AN can take any spatial pattern. Hence, the proposed design has potential
in jamming the eavesdroppers more effectively, based upon the channel state information (CSI). We derive
an optimization approach to the SRM problem through both analysis and convex conic optimization
machinery. We show that the SRM problem can be recast as a single-variable optimization problem, and
that resultant problem can be efficiently handled by solving a sequence of semidefinite programs. Our
framework deals with a general setup of multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers, and can cater for additional
constraints arising from specific application scenarios, such as interference temperature constraints in
interference networks. We also generalize the framework to an imperfect CSI case where a worst-case
robust SRM formulation is considered. A suboptimal but safe solution to the outage-constrained robust
SRM design is also investigated. Simulation results show that the proposed AN-aided SRM design yields
significant secrecy rate gains over an optimal no-AN design and the isotropic AN design, especially when
there are more eavesdroppers.
Index terms− Physical-layer security, artificial noise, transmit beamforming, semidefinite program.
EDICS: MSP-CODR (MIMO precoder/decoder design), MSP-APPL (Applications of MIMO communi-
cations and signal processing), SAM-BEAM (Applications of sensor and array multichannel processing)
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, multi-antenna techniques have been extensively investigated from the perspective
of providing high throughput and reliable communications. Recently, there has been growing interest in
using multiple antennas to achieve secure communication, which is known as physical-layer secrecy.
Intuitively speaking, the idea of physical-layer secrecy is to add structured redundancy in the transmit
signal such that the legitimate user can correctly decode the confidential information, but the eavesdroppers
can retrieve almost nothing from their observations [1], [2]. To make physical-layer secrecy viable, we
usually need the legitimate user’s channel condition to be better than the eavesdroppers’. However, this
may not be always possible in practice. To alleviate the dependence on the channels conditions, recent
studies are mainly focused on multi-antenna transmission, since multiple transmit antennas provide spatial
degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) to degrade the reception of the eavesdroppers. A possible way to do this is
transmit beamforming, which concentrates the transmit signal over the direction of the legitimate user
while reducing power leakage to the eavesdroppers at the same time. Apart from this, a more active
approach is to send artificially generated noise to interfere the eavesdroppers deliberately.
The notion of using artificial noise (AN) to enhance physical-layer security was first introduced by Negi
and Goel in [3], and has received much attention in recent studies; see [3]–[9] and the references therein.
The way of generating AN depends on how much the transmitter knows the eavesdroppers’ channel state
information (CSI). Consider a case where no eavesdropper’s CSI is available. A popular design in such a
case is isotropic AN [3], where AN is uniformly spread on the legitimate channel’s nullspace. By doing so,
one can guarantee that no interference will be made to the legitimate receiver, while the eavesdroppers’
reception may be degraded by AN. A picture is shown in Fig. 1(a) to illustrate how the isotropic AN
design works. On the other hand, consider cases where the eavesdroppers’ CSI is available. This may
arise from scenarios where the eavesdroppers are also users of the system, and the transmitter aims to
provide different types of users with different services. Moreover, for an active eavesdropper, the CSI can
be estimated from the eavesdropper’s transmission. More interestingly, a very recent study has suggested
that even for a passive eavesdropper, there is a possibility for one to estimate the CSI through the local
oscillator power inadvertently leaked from the eavesdropper’s receiver RF frontend [10]. With knowledge
of CSI, we can block the eavesdroppers much more effectively by generating spatially selective AN,
rather than keeping AN isotropic [11], [12]. Fig. 1(b) shows a picture to illustrate the idea of spatially
selective AN. However, perfect CSI may not be always available in practice, and an important issue is
how to robustify a secure transmit design in the presence of imperfect CSI, which is a more general and
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3realistic assumption. Tackling imperfect CSI in physical-layer security is presently an emerging subject
with several concurrent endeavors; e.g., the worst-case robust design [13]–[15], the outage robust design
[16], [17] and the ergodic design [8].
Fig. 1. Secure transmission by (a) isotropic AN; (b) spatially selective AN.
This paper concentrates on the problem of AN-aided secrecy rate maximization (SRM) of a multi-input
single-output (MISO) channel overheard by multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers, with either perfect
or imperfect CSI. This problem has been addressed when there is no AN [15] (also [4] for the one
eavesdropper case). In the present problem, we consider joint optimization of the confidential information
covariance and the AN covariance, and there is a design flexibility for the AN to take any spatial pattern.
This AN-aided SRM problem is a challenging optimization problem. The main difficulty lies in the AN
covariance, which makes the secrecy rate expression more complicated to optimize. To make the AN-aided
SRM problem easier to handle, a vast majority of existing works have to impose additional restrictions on
AN, which leads to tractable but SRM suboptimal designs. For example, [3]–[8], [13], [16], [17] restrict
AN in the nullspace of the legitimate channel, [11] requires AN to cause no decrease in the legitimate
channel’s mutual information, and [9], [18], [19] assume that transmit beamforming is employed to
generate AN. We should point out that all the above mentioned works consider only one eavesdropper and
the sum power constraint. On the other hand, there are works that consider additional design constraints for
satisfying some application-specific requirements, e.g., per-antenna power constraints, and the interference
temperature constraints for interference networks [20]–[22]. However, AN is not incorporated in those
designs and only one single-antenna eavesdropper is assumed. In addition, there are some other AN-aided
secure transmit designs, e.g., the SINR-based design [5], [12] and the MSE-based design [23]. However,
the goal of those designs is to provide the legitimate receiver with certain QoS, rather than directly
maximizing the secrecy rate.
In this paper, we will develop a semidefinite program (SDP)-based optimization approach to handle the
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4AN-aided SRM problem, with no structural restrictions on the AN. Our problem formulation considers
multiple multi-antenna evesdroppers, either perfect or imperfect CSI with the eavesdroppers, and addi-
tional design constraints arising from certain application-specific scenarios (such as the aforementioned).
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
1) For the perfect CSI case, we derive an equivalent problem of the SRM problem through analysis.
The equivalent problem is less complex than the original SRM. We show that the equivalent problem
can be recast as a single-variable optimization problem, and that the latter can be handled by solving
a sequence of convex SDPs, for which efficient and reliable solvers are readily available [24], [25].
2) For the imperfect CSI case, we consider a worst-case robust extension of the SRM problem. We
show that the worst-case robust SRM (WCR-SRM) problem can be handled in a similar manner as
SRM, though the development is more involved and a specific matrix inequality lemma is required.
A suboptimal but safe solution to an outage-constrained robust SRM (OCR-SRM) problem is also
investigated.
3) Our SRM problem formulation assumes general transmit covariance for the confidential information,
and does not fix the transmit strategy as transmit beamforming. Interestingly, in deriving the
equivalent SRM problem, we show that transmit beamforming is an SRM optimal strategy for the
confidential information transmission. This result is meaningful in giving a theoretical justification
for using transmit beamforming in the considered scenario. Moreover, the result applies to both the
perfect CSI case and worst-case robust imperfect CSI case. We should mention that the optimality
of transmit beamforming has been proven in [4], [26] under the assumption of one eavesdropper,
no AN and perfect CSI. Our result in comparison is more general.
This paper is organized as follows. A system model description and problem statement is given in
Section II. Section III considers the SRM problem for the MISO multi-eavesdropper scenario with perfect
CSI, wherein the SDP-based optimization approach is established. Section IV extends the SRM results
to the imperfect CSI case. Simulation results comparing the proposed SRM solutions and some other
suboptimal secrecy transmit designs are illustrated in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
Our notations are as follows. AH , Tr(A), rank(A) and det(A) represent the Hermitian (conjugate)
transpose, trace, rank and determinant of a matrix A; I denotes an identity matrix; ‖·‖ and ‖·‖F represent
the ℓ2 norm and Frobenius norm, respectively; A  0 (A ≻ 0) means that A is a Hermitian positive
semidefinite (definite) matrix; [A]m,n denotes the (m,n)th element of matrix A; R+ denotes the set of all
nonnegative real numbers; HN+ denotes the set of all N -by-N Hermitian positive semidefinite matrices;
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5x ∼ CN (µ,Ω) means that x is a random vector following a complex circular Gaussian distribution with
mean µ and covariance Ω.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System Model
Consider the scenario shown in Fig. 1(b). A multi-antenna transmitter, called Alice, intends to send
confidential information to a single-antenna legitimate receiver, called Bob, in the presence of a number
of multi-antenna eavesdroppers, called Eves. All the communication links are assumed to undergo slow
frequency-flat fading. The received signals at Bob and Eves may then be modeled as
yb(t) = h
Hx(t) + n(t), (1a)
ye,k(t) = G
H
k x(t) + vk(t), k ∈ K, (1b)
respectively, where K , {1, . . . ,K}; h ∈ CNt is the channel response from Alice to Bob, with Nt
being the number of transmit antennas; Gk ∈ CNt×Ne,k is the channel response from Alice to kth Eve,
with Ne,k being the number of receive antennas at kth Eve; K is the number of Eves; n(t) ∼ CN (0, 1)
and vk(t) ∼ CN (0, INe,k) are standard additive white complex Gaussian noises at Bob and kth Eve,
respectively; x(t) ∈ CNt is the transmit signal vector, which possesses the following form
x(t) = s(t) + z(t).
Here, {s(t)} is the coded confidential information intended for Bob, and z(t) is the noise vector artificially
created by Alice to interfere Eves, i.e., the so-called AN. The confidential signal vector s(t) is assumed
to follow a complex Gaussian distribution CN (0,W) [2], where W is the transmit covariance and is
to be designed. For the AN, we assume z(t) ∼ CN (0,Σ), where Σ is the AN covariance and is again
to be designed. Note that if W is chosen such that W = wwH for some w ∈ CNt , or equivalently,
rank(W) ≤ 1, then the transmit strategy for the confidential information is transmit beamforming; viz.,
s(t) = ws(t) where s(t) is a data stream carrying the confidential information.
B. Problem Statement
Our problem is to design the transmit and AN covariances W,Σ such that maximum information
secrecy can be achieved. Given (W,Σ), an achievable secrecy rate is given by [27]
Rs = min
k∈K
{Cb(W,Σ)− Ce,k(W,Σ)} , (2)
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6where Cb(W,Σ) and Ce,k(W,Σ) are the mutual information at Bob and Eves, respectively:
Cb(W,Σ) = log
(
1 +
hHWh
1 + hHΣh
)
, (3a)
Ce,k(W,Σ) = log det(I+ (I +G
H
k ΣGk)
−1GHk WGk). (3b)
Note that (2) is a rate at which perfect secrecy is possible; i.e., Bob can correctly decode the confidential
information at Rs bits per channel use, while Eves can retrieve almost nothing about the information.
Readers are referred to the information theoretic security literature, such as [2], for the detail. Assuming
perfect CSI at Alice, the secrecy-rate maximization (SRM) design problem is formulated as:
R⋆s = max
W0,Σ0
min
k∈K
{Cb(W,Σ) − Ce,k(W,Σ)} (4a)
s.t. Tr(W +Σ) ≤ P, (4b)
Tr(Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L, (4c)
where L , {1, . . . , L}; P > 0 specifies the transmit sum power budget, and Φl ∈ HNt+ , ρl ∈ R+, ∀l ∈ L,
are given design parameters. A standard SRM problem has the sum power constraint (4b), but not (4c).
In the following, we describe two application-specific scenarios where (4c) is necessary.
1) Per-antenna power constraints: In multi-antenna system implementations, each antenna is often
equipped with its own power amplifier (PA). In order to operate within the linear region of each PA,
one may want to limit the per-antenna peak power [22], [28]. The per-antenna power constraints
can be formulated as
[W+Σ]ll ≤ ρl, l = 1, . . . , Nt, (5)
where ρl is the power limit of the lth antenna. The per-antenna power constraints above can be
represented by (4c), by setting Φl = eleHl , L = Nt, where el is the lth unit vector (i.e., [el]i = 1
for i = l and [el]i = 0 for all i 6= l).
2) Interference temperature constraints: Consider an extension of the secure communication problem
setup in Section II-A, where the system is operating under an interference network scenario. In
such a case, besides the security concern arising from Eves, Alice also needs to cautiously control
her transmission such that no excessive interference will be made to other network users. Take the
spectrum-sharing cognitive radio (CR) network as an example. Alice and Bob are the secondary
transmitter and receiver, respectively. To limit interference to the primary users, the following
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7interference temperature constraints can be added in the SRM design [20]:
Tr
(
RHl (W +Σ)Rl
)
≤ ρl, l = 1, . . . , L, (6)
where Rl ∈ CNt×Np,l is the channel response from Alice to lth primary user, with Np,l being the
number of receive antennas at the lth primary user; L is the number of primary users; ρl ≥ 0
is the maximal allowable interference level of the lth primary user. The interference temperature
constraints (6) can be represented by (4c), by setting Φl , RlRHl , l = 1, . . . , L. It is worthwhile to
note that apart from CR, the same interference control idea may be applied to multicell interference
networks [29].
III. AN SDP-BASED APPROACH TO THE SRM PROBLEM
In this section, we derive an SDP-based optimization approach to the SRM problem (4).
A. A Tight Relaxation of the SRM Problem (4)
To start with, we rewrite the SRM problem (4) as
R⋆s = max
W0,Σ0,β≥1
Cb(W,Σ)− log β (7a)
s.t. Ce,k(W,Σ) ≤ log β, ∀k ∈ K, (7b)
Tr(W +Σ) ≤ P, Tr(Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L, (7c)
where β is a slack variable introduced to simplify the objective function. Physically, log β can be
interpreted as the maximal allowable mutual information of Eves’ links. By adjusting β, we can control the
level of mutual information between Alice and Eves, and consequently, the secrecy rate. By substituting
(3a) and (3b) into (7), we express problem (7) as
R⋆s = max
W,Σ,β
log
(
1 +
hHWh
1 + hHΣh
)
− log β (8a)
s.t. log det
(
I+
(
I+GHk ΣGk
)−1
GHk WGk
)
≤ log β, ∀k ∈ K, (8b)
W  0, Σ  0, β ≥ 1, and (7c) satisfied.
Problem (8) is nonconvex. In particular, the most challenging part lies in (8b), which can be verified to
be nonconvex and may be difficult to deal with. To circumvent this difficulty, our idea is to derive a
relatively easy-to-handle inequality in place of (8b):
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8Proposition 1. The following implication holds
log det
(
I+
(
I+GHΣG
)−1
GHWG
)
≤ log β (9a)
=⇒ (β − 1)(I +GHΣG)−GHWG  0 (9b)
for any G ∈ CN×M , W ∈ HN+ , and Σ ∈ HN+ . Moreover, (9a) and (9b) are equivalent if rank(W) ≤ 1.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A. From Proposition 1, we note the following:
Remark 1. The merit of (9b) is that for any fixed β, (9b) is a convex inequality. Specifically, (9b) is a
linear matrix inequality w.r.t. (W,Σ). In comparison, in (9a), we are confronted with the troublesome
matrix inversion and determinant.
Remark 2. Proposition 1 indicates that any (W,Σ, β) satisfying (9a) also satisfies (9b). In other words,
(9b) is a relaxation of (9a) in the sense that replacing (8b) with (9b) yields a larger feasible solution set
(or equivalently higher secrecy rate) for the SRM problem (8). In addition, such a replacement makes
no difference if rank(W) ≤ 1.
Now, let us replace (8b) with (9b) and consider the subsequent relaxed SRM problem, which is
formulated as follows:
R¯⋆s = max
W,Σ,β
log
(
1 + hH(W +Σ)h
β(1 + hHΣh)
)
(10a)
s.t. (β − 1)(I +GHk ΣGk)  G
H
k WGk, ∀k ∈ K, (10b)
W  0, Σ  0, β ≥ 1, (7c) satisfied, (10c)
where R¯⋆s denotes the optimal objective value of problem (10). As discussed in Remark 2, problem (10)
relaxes the feasible solution set of problem (8), and hence has R⋆s ≤ R¯⋆s in general. Interestingly, we
show that R⋆s = R¯⋆s always holds for problem (10).
Theorem 1. Problem (10) is a tight relaxation to, or an equivalent form of, the SRM problem (8). In
particular, there exists an optimal solution (W⋆,Σ⋆, β⋆) of problem (10), for which rank(W⋆) ≤ 1; the
solution (W⋆,Σ⋆, β⋆) is also an optimal solution of problem (8), achieving R⋆s = R¯⋆s .
Theorem 1 suggests that we can equivalently solve the SRM problem (8) by solving the relaxed (and
less difficult) problem (10). The proof of Theorem 1 is relegated to Appendix B. The intuition behind
the proof is the equivalence between (10b) and (8b) when rank(W) ≤ 1, cf. Proposition 1. This key
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9observation motivates us to prove the existence of an optimalW⋆ of problem (10) that has rank(W⋆) ≤ 1.
We have the following remarks for Theorem 1:
Remark 3. Theorem 1 implies that the SRM problem (8) admits an optimal W⋆ with rank(W⋆) ≤ 1,
which holds true irrespective of the number of Eves and the number of antennas of Eves. Physically, it
means that transmit beamforming is an optimal strategy for the confidential information transmission.
Remark 4. One should note that the solution correspondence between (8) and (10) holds not only at the
optimal β⋆. In fact, the proof of the theorem reveals that given any feasible β in (8), the corresponding
optimal (W,Σ) can be found by solving the relaxation (10) for the same β.
In Theorem 1, our statement is that a rank-one SRM-optimal W⋆ exists for problem (10). In fact, the
proof of Theorem 1 reveals that a rank-one SRM-optimal W⋆ can always be constructed algorithmically.
Based on the proof, we have the following rank-one solution construction procedure:
Corollary 1. Suppose that (W¯⋆, Σ¯⋆, β⋆) is an optimal solution returned by solving problem (10). If
rank(W¯⋆) ≤ 1, then output (W¯⋆, Σ¯⋆, β⋆) as an optimal solution of the SRM problem (8). Otherwise,
solve the following SDP
(W⋆,Σ⋆) = arg min
W0,Σ0
Tr(W +Σ)
s.t. hH (W + µΣ)h+ µ ≥ 0,
(β⋆ − 1)(I +GHk ΣGk)  G
H
k WGk, ∀k ∈ K,
Tr (Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L,
(11)
where µ = 1 − β⋆2R¯⋆s , and output (W⋆,Σ⋆, β⋆) as an optimal solution of the SRM problem (8). In
particular, it must hold true that rank(W⋆) ≤ 1.
Corollary 1 is a direct consequence of the proof of Theorem 1; see Appendix B for the details.
B. An SDP-based Line Search Method for Relaxed SRM (10)
We now focus on solving the tight SRM relaxation (10) derived in the last subsection. Problem (10)
can be reformulated as a one-variable optimization problem, which can be efficiently handled by solving
a sequence of SDPs. To show this, note that
β ≤ 1 +
hHWh
1 + hHΣh
≤ 1 + hHWh ≤ 1 + P‖h‖2, (12)
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where the first inequality is due to (10a) and R⋆s ≥ 0, and the third inequality follows from the fact that
hHWh ≤ Tr(W)‖h‖2 for any W  0 and Tr(W) ≤ P . Then we rewrite (10) as
γ¯⋆ = max
α
ϕ(α)
s.t. (1 + P‖h‖2)−1 ≤ α ≤ 1,
(13)
where log γ¯⋆ = R¯⋆s , α = 1/β and
ϕ(α) , max
W,Σ
1 + hH(W +Σ)h
α−1(1 + hHΣh)
(14a)
s.t. (α−1 − 1)(I +GHk ΣGk)  G
H
k WGk, ∀k ∈ K, (14b)
W  0, Σ  0, and (7c) satisfied. (14c)
The function ϕ(α) does not have a closed form, but is numerically tractable. In particular, (14) can be
converted to a convex optimization problem. By applying the Charnes-Cooper transformation [30], where
we introduce a change of variables
W = Q/ξ, Σ = Γ/ξ, ξ > 0, (15)
we can equivalently express (14) as
ϕ(α) = max
Q,Γ,ξ
ξ + hH(Q+ Γ)h (16a)
s.t. ξ + hHΓh = α, (16b)
(1− α)(ξI +GHk ΓGk)  αG
H
k QGk, ∀k ∈ K, (16c)
Tr (Φl(Q+ Γ)) ≤ ρlξ, ∀l ∈ L, (16d)
Tr(Q+ Γ) ≤ ξP, Q  0, Γ  0. (16e)
The motivation of the transformation above is that we want to transform the fractional objective function
in (14a), which is quasiconvex but not convex, to the linear (and convex) objective function in (16a).
Intuitively, the idea is to fix the denominator of (14a), and that leads to the constraint in (16b). The proof
of the solution equivalence of problems (14) and (16) can be easily obtained by following the argument in
[15]. The upshot of the transformation above is that problem (16) is a convex SDP, which can be efficiently
and conveniently solved in a globally optimal manner by off-the-shelf conic optimization softwares, e.g.
SeDuMi [24] and CVX [25]. Therefore, the SDP (16) provides us with an efficient way to compute
ϕ(α) for any fixed α. Since α lies in the interval [(1 + P‖h‖2)−1, 1], the single-variable optimization
problem (13) can be handled by performing a one-dimensional line search over α, and choosing the one
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that leads to the maximum ϕ(α) as an optimal solution of (13). In the optimization literature, there are
many derivative-free search algorithms for solving one-dimensional optimization problems, e.g., compass
or coordinate search (cf. [31], [32]). In practice, we use either uniform sampling or the golden search
[33] to obtain a satisfactory solution. Once problem (13) is solved, the solution (Q⋆,Γ⋆, ξ⋆) outputted
from the SDP (16) can be used to recover W⋆ and Σ⋆ through the relation (15). Note that an additional
rank-one solution construction procedure may be needed depending on the rank of W⋆. This can be done
by further solving the SDP (11), cf. Corollary 1.
Summarizing the development in this section, we have presented an SDP-based optimization approach
to the SRM problem (4). The approach is based on solving problem (10), which is equivalent to
problem (4) as our analysis has revealed. To solve problem (10), we have proposed an SDP-based line
search formulation in Section III-B. In addition to design optimization, our development has shown that
the transmit beamforming strategy is SRM-optimal for the transmission of confidential information.
IV. EXTENSION TO ROBUST SRM
Our next endeavor is to extend the optimization approach developed in the last section to an imperfect
CSI case, where Alice has incomplete knowledge of Eves’ CSI. Specifically, we consider a worst-case
robust SRM (WCR-SRM) formulation under norm-bounded CSI uncertainties, and derive an SDP-based
solution approach to the problem. We will also illustrate how the developed WCR-SRM design solution
can be used to provide a safe approximation to an even more challenging design, namely, the outage-
constrained robust design (OCR-SRM) under Gaussian distributed CSI uncertainties.
A. The Worst-Case Robust SRM Problem
We consider the same problem setup as in Section II, with the additional assumption that Alice has
imperfect CSI on Eves’ links. To put into context, let
Gk = G¯k +∆Gk, k = 1, . . . ,K, (17)
where Gk is the actual channel response from Alice to the kth Eve, as before; G¯k is Alice’s presumed
value of Gk; ∆Gk represents the associated CSI error. In the WCR-SRM formulation, we assume that
∆Gk are deterministic and bounded, satisfying [13], [14]
‖∆Gk‖F ≤ εk, k = 1, . . . ,K
for some εk > 0, k = 1, . . . ,K. The WCR-SRM design problem is formulated as
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R⋆s = max
W0,Σ0
min
k∈K
{
Cb(W,Σ) − C
worst
e,k (W,Σ)
} (18a)
s.t. Tr(W +Σ) ≤ P, (18b)
Tr (Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L, (18c)
where we recall that Cb(W,Σ) = log
(
1 + h
HWh
1+hHΣh
)
is Bob’s mutual information, and
Cworste,k (W,Σ) , max
Gk∈Bk
log det
(
I+
(
I+GHk ΣGk
)−1
GHk WGk
)
,
Bk ,
{
Gk | Gk = G¯k +∆Gk, ‖∆Gk‖F ≤ εk
}
, ∀k ∈ K
is the kth-Eve’s worst-case, or largest possible, mutual information among the set of all admissible CSIs
Bk. Problem (18) is a safe design—under the optimal design (W,Σ) of problem (18), the actual secrecy
rate w.r.t. the true Gk’s, albeit uncertain, must not lie below the optimal worst-case secrecy rate R⋆s .
Our WCR-SRM optimization approach is derived as follows. We rewrite (18) as
R⋆s = max
W0,Σ0,β≥1
log
(1 + hH(W +Σ)h
1 + hHΣh
)
− log β (19a)
s.t. log det
(
I+
(
I+GHk ΣGk
)−1
GHk WGk
)
≤ log β, ∀Gk ∈ Bk, k ∈ K, (19b)
(18b)− (18c) satisfied. (19c)
Note that in (19b), there are infinitely many inequalities w.r.t. Gk to satisfy; this makes the WCR-SRM
problem more challenging to solve than the SRM. Let us set aside the infinitely many inequalities issue
for the moment. By using Proposition 1, which has played a key role in solving SRM in the last section,
we have the following relaxation for (19b):
log det
(
I+
(
I+GHk ΣGk
)−1
GHk WGk
)
≤ log β, ∀Gk ∈ Bk, (20a)
=⇒(β − 1)(I +GHk ΣGk)  G
H
k WGk, ∀Gk ∈ Bk, (20b)
for k = 1, . . . ,K. Moreover, (20a) and (20b) become equivalent if rank(W) ≤ 1 (again, by Proposi-
tion 1). Eq. (20b) corresponds to an infinite number of quadratic matrix inequalities w.r.t. Gk. While
(20b) is less complex than (20a), we still need to find an efficient way to manage the infinitely many
inequalities in (20b). It turns out that the latter is possible, by employing an advanced matrix inequality
result in the optimization literature.
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Lemma 1 (Luo-Sturm-Zhang [34]). Let f(X) = XHAX+XHB+BHX+C, andD  0. The following
equivalence holds:
f(X)  0, ∀ X ∈ {X | Tr(DXXH) ≤ 1},
⇐⇒

C BH
B A

− t

I 0
0 −D

  0, for some t ≥ 0. (21)
By applying Lemma 1 to (20b), we establish the following key result:
Proposition 2. The following implication holds
log det
(
I+
(
I+GHk ΣGk
)−1
GHk WGk
)
≤ log β, ∀Gk ∈ Bk, (22a)
=⇒ Tk(β,W,Σ, tk)  0, for some tk ≥ 0, (22b)
for any k ∈ K, where
Tk(β,W,Σ, tk) =

(β − 1− tk)I+ G¯Hk ((β − 1)Σ−W) G¯k G¯Hk ((β − 1)Σ−W)
((β − 1)Σ −W) G¯k (β − 1)Σ−W +
tk
ε2k
I

 . (23)
Moreover, (22a) and (22b) are equivalent if rank(W) ≤ 1.
Proof: Following (20), it suffices to show that for each k, (20b) is equivalent to (22b). Eq. (20b) can
be represented by the left-hand side of (21). Specifically, we substitute (17) into (20b), and then set
X = ∆Gk, A = (β − 1)Σ−W, B = ((β − 1)Σ −W) G¯k, C = G¯
H
k ((β − 1)Σ −W) G¯k + (β − 1)I
and D = ε−2k I. By the right-hand side of (21), we obtain (22b) as an equivalent form of (20b). 
The upshot of the implication in Proposition 2 is that fixing β, (22b) is a single linear matrix
inequality w.r.t. (W,Σ, tk) (rather than infinitely many), and can be efficiently handled by convex conic
optimization. Therefore, we replace (19b) by (22b) to obtain a relaxation of (19), given as follows:
R¯⋆s = max
W0,Σ0,{tk},β≥1
log
(1 + hH(W +Σ)h
β(1 + hHΣh)
)
s.t. Tk(β,W,Σ, tk)  0, tk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K
(18b)− (18c) satisfied,
(24)
where R¯⋆s is the optimal objective value of (24) and we have R⋆s ≤ R¯⋆s . Now, a crucial question is whether
(24) is a tight relaxation of the WCR-SRM problem (19). Remarkably, we prove that the answer is yes.
Theorem 2. Problem (24) is a tight relaxation to, or an equivalent formulation of, the WCR-SRM
problem (19). In particular, there exists an optimal solution (W⋆,Σ⋆, β⋆) of problem (24), for which
rank(W⋆) ≤ 1; the solution (W⋆,Σ⋆, β⋆) is also an optimal solution of (19), achieving R⋆s = R¯⋆s .
August 21, 2018 DRAFT
14
Corollary 2. Suppose that (W¯⋆, Σ¯⋆, β⋆) is an optimal solution returned by solving (24). If rank(W¯⋆) ≤
1, then output (W¯⋆, Σ¯⋆, β⋆) as an optimal solution of the WCR-SRM problem (19). Otherwise, solve the
following SDP
(W⋆,Σ⋆, {t⋆k}) = arg min
W,Σ,{tk}
Tr(W +Σ)
s.t. hH(W + µΣ)h+ µ ≥ 0,
Tk(β
⋆,W,Σ, tk)  0, tk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,
Tr(Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L,
W  0, Σ  0,
(25)
where µ = 1− 2R¯⋆sβ⋆, and output (W⋆,Σ⋆, β⋆) as an optimal solution of the WCR-SRM problem (19).
In particular, it must hold true that rank(W⋆) ≤ 1.
Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 can be seen as a generalization of their perfect-CSI counterpart in Theorem 1
and Corollary 1, respectively. The proof of the former is more difficult to obtain than that of the latter,
owing to the complicated structure of Tk(β,W,Σ, tk) [see (23)]. We relegate the proof to Appendix C.
Since we have identified that (24) is a tight relaxation of the WCR-SRM problem (19), our last step is
to solve (24). Problem (24) can be handled by using the same SDP-based line search method developed
in the last section. For conciseness, here we only point out several key steps. We reexpress (24) in the
form of the one-dimensional problem in (13), where ϕ(α) is now given by
ϕ(α) = max
W0,Σ0,{tk}
1 + hH(W +Σ)h
α−1(1 + hHΣh)
s.t. Tk(α
−1,W,Σ, tk)  0, tk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,
Tr(W +Σ) ≤ P, Tr (Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L.
(26)
By a change of variables W = Q/ξ,Σ = Γ/ξ, tk = λk/ξ, ξ > 0, and using the Charnes-Cooper
transformation, we show that (26) can be converted to a convex SDP
max
Q0,Γ0,ξ,{λk}
ξ + hH(Q+ Γ)h
s.t. ξ + hHΓh = α,
T¯k(Q,Γ, α, ξ, λk)  0, λk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,
Tr(Q+ Γ) ≤ Pξ, Tr (Φl(Q+ Γ)) ≤ ρlξ, ∀l ∈ L,
(27)
where
T¯k(Q,Γ, α, ξ, λk) =

(ξ − αξ − αλk)I+ G¯Hk ((1− α)Γ− αQ) G¯k G¯Hk ((1− α)Γ− αQ)
((1− α)Γ− αQ) G¯k (1− α)Γ− αQ+
αλk
ε2k
I

 .
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Hence, for a fixed α, ϕ(α) can be computed by solving the SDP (27). Problem (24) is then handled by
applying a line search on ϕ(α) w.r.t. α; the procedure is the same as that described in Section III-B.
Summarizing, in this section we have tackled the WCR-SRM problem (18) by deriving a tight re-
laxation. The tight WCR-SRM relaxation, given in (24), can be handled by an SDP-based line search
procedure. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to mention that by Theorem 2, transmit beamforming is still an
optimal confidential information transmission strategy for the WCR-SRM formulation.
Remark 5. One may be curious to know whether the AN-aided WCR-SRM solution method developed
above can be extended to the scenario where Bob’s channel is also imperfectly known. In fact, this has
been considered for the no-AN case [15]. For the AN-aided case here, such an extension is possible; the
idea is to follow the same derivations as above and [15]. It can be shown that the problem can once again
be handled via one-dimensional line search, but the line search involves solving a sequence of factional
SDPs, which is quasiconvex and is computationally more expensive to solve. As a future direction, it
will be interesting to study efficient methods for handling this problem.
B. The Outage-Constrained Robust SRM Problem
The WCR-SRM formulation in the previous subsection is an absolutely safe design under bounded CSI
uncertainties. In this subsection, we consider an alternative robust formulation where the CSI errors ∆Gk
are random and follow certain distribution. Specifically, we employ the popular i.i.d. complex Gaussian
CSI error model
[∆Gk]m,n ∼ CN (0, σ
2
k), ∀m,n, k = 1, . . . ,K. (28)
Moreover, ∆Gk is assumed to be independent of ∆Gl for any k 6= l. In this setup, since ∆Gk are
unbounded, it may not be possible to deliver an absolutely safe design. However, one can adopt a
(1 − δ)% safe design, for some outage probability specification δ [16], [35]. Consider the following
outage-constrained robust SRM formulation:
max
W,Σ,Rs
Rs (29a)
s.t. Pr{∆Gk}Kk=1
{
Cb(W,Σ)−max
k∈K
Ce,k(W,Σ) ≥ Rs
}
≥ 1− δ, (29b)
Tr (Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L, (29c)
Tr(W +Σ) ≤ P, W  0, Σ  0, (29d)
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where Cb(W,Σ) and Ce,k(W,Σ) have been defined in (3); 0 < δ < 0.5 is a given parameter specifying
the maximum tolerable secrecy outage probability, i.e., the probability of the achievable secrecy rate
falling below Rs [35]. Therefore, the goal of (29) is to maximize the δ%-outage secrecy rate.
The OCR-SRM problem (29) is very challenging to solve. The main obstacle lies in the probabilistic
constraint (29b), which is unlikely to have a tractable closed-form expression except for some special
cases, e.g., when there is only one Eve with a single antenna and AN is restricted to lie on the nullspace
of h [16]. As a compromise, we consider an approximation of (29) based on the previous WCR-SRM
design, which we have solved. We summarize our main result in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Consider the WCR-SRM problem (18). Suppose that the CSI error radii εk are chosen as
εk =
√
σ2k
2
F−1χ2
2NtNe,k
((1− δ)1/K), k = 1, . . . ,K, (30)
where F−1χ2
2NtNe,k
(·) denotes the inverse cumulative distribution function of a Chi-square random variable
with 2NtNe,k degrees of freedom. Then, problem (18) is a safe approximation to the OCR-SRM prob-
lem (29), in the sense that every feasible point of problem (18) is also feasible to problem (29), and thus
satisfies the secrecy rate satisfaction probability constraint (29b).
The insight behind Proposition 3 is that the robust nature of WCR-SRM should lead to certain secrecy
rate satisfaction probability values; especially, the larger εk are, the more conservative the design would
be and the higher the secrecy rate satisfaction probability should be. Eq. (30) is essentially a sufficient
condition under which any feasible point of the WCR-SRM problem satisfies the OCR-SRM probability
constraint in (29b).
Proof of Proposition 3: By noting the independence between Gk and Gl, ∀k 6= l, we have
(29b) ⇐⇒
K∏
k=1
Pr∆Gk {Cb(W,Σ)− Ce,k(W,Σ) ≥ Rs} ≥ 1− δ, (31a)
⇐= Pr∆Gk {Cb(W,Σ)− Ce,k(W,Σ) ≥ Rs} ≥ 1− δ¯, ∀k (31b)
where δ¯ = 1 − (1 − δ)1/K . Our next step is to derive a safe approximation to (31b). This is done by
exploiting the following implication:
Cb(W,Σ) − Ce,k(W,Σ) ≥ Rs, ∀ ‖∆Gk‖
2
F ≤ ε
2
k
=⇒Pr∆Gk {Cb(W,Σ)− Ce,k(W,Σ) ≥ Rs} ≥ 1− δ¯,
(32)
where the uncertainty radius εk is chosen to satisfy Pr∆Gk{‖∆Gk‖2F ≤ ε2k} = 1 − δ¯. The above
implication can be deduced using an intuitive argument called sphere bounding. Specifically, in the left-
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hand side of (32), we set a spherical boundary εk to the unbounded random error ∆Gk, such that
1 − δ¯ portion of ∆Gk’s realizations lies in the sphere, and meanwhile, for all of these ∆Gk in the
sphere, the worst secrecy rate is ensured no less than Rs. For such a choice of εk, the right-hand side
of (32) apparently holds. In addition, it follows from (28) that εk can be explicitly calculated by (30).
Readers are referred to the literature, such as [36], for more complete descriptions of the sphere bounding
method. Now, by applying the implications (31) and (32) to the probabilistic constraint (29b), we obtain
a restriction of, or safe approximation to, the OCR-SRM problem (29):
max
W,Σ,Rs
Rs (33a)
s.t. Cb(W,Σ) − Ce,k(W,Σ) ≥ Rs,∀ ‖∆Gk‖
2
F ≤ ε
2
k, k = 1, . . . ,K, (33b)
Tr (Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L, (33c)
Tr(W +Σ) ≤ P, W  0, Σ  0. (33d)
Note that any feasible point of (33) is also feasible to the OCR-SRM problem (29), by (31) and (32). It
can be easily seen that problem (33) is equivalent to the WCR-SRM problem (18). 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we use Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate the performance of the AN-aided SRM
design obtained by the proposed SDP-based optimization technique.
A. Example 1: Secrecy Rate Performance under the Sum Power Constraint
In this example, our goal is to illustrate the secrecy rate performance of the standard AN-aided SRM
design; i.e., problem (4) with the sum power constraint (4b) only. We compare the performance of the
proposed AN-aided SRM design (Section III) with that of two existing designs, namely, the isotropic
AN design [7] and the optimal no-AN SRM design [15]. In the isotropic AN design, the transmit and
AN covariances are given by [7]
Wiso−AN =
P
2‖h‖2
hhH , Σiso−AN =
P
2
Π⊥h
‖Π⊥h ‖
2
F
, (34)
whereΠ⊥h = I−hhH/‖h‖2 denotes the orthogonal complement projector of h. In words, the isotropic AN
design uses half of the transmit power to transmit the confidential information via straight beamforming,
and uses the other half to transmit AN on the nullspace of h isotropically. The no-AN SRM design is the
solution of problem (4), but with Σ prefixing as 0. The no-AN SRM design can be obtained by solving
one SDP, as shown in our previous work [15] (also [37]).
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The simulation settings are as follows. The number of transmit antennas at Alice is Nt = 5. The number
of receive antennas at Eves is Ne,k = 3 for all k. In each simulation trial, Bob and Eves’ channels are
randomly generated following an i.i.d. complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance.
Fig. 2 plots the secrecy rates of the various designs w.r.t. the sum power P . We examine two cases,
namely, one Eve (K = 1) and three Eves (K = 3), respectively. The more interesting case is the three
Eves case, while the one Eve case aims to serve as a reference. We will elaborate on this soon. For the
two cases, it can be seen that the proposed AN-aided SRM design achieves a secrecy rate performance at
least no worse than the other two designs. In fact, the performance gain of the AN-aided SRM design can
be quite significant. For example, for the case of K = 3, the secrecy rate gap between the AN-aided SRM
design and the isotropic AN design can be close to 2 bits per channel use when P is large. Moreover,
the gap between AN-aided and no-AN SRM designs (for K = 3) is even more dramatic.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rates versus the sum power.
Fig. 2 reveals an interesting phenomenon. We see that for K = 1, the secrecy rates of the AN-aided
and no-AN SRM designs are exactly the same. This means that AN may be not necessary for the one
Eve case. In fact, it is known that the no-AN SRM design achieves the secrecy capacity for the one
Eve case [4], and the simulation result here has further confirmed that. However, the picture becomes
drastically different when there are more than one Eves. For K = 3, we can clearly observe from Fig. 2
that the secrecy rate gap between the no-AN and AN-aided SRM designs are widening quite substantially
with P . In fact, the secrecy rate of the no-AN SRM design almost stays unaltered for P ≥ 10dB, that even
the isotropic AN design can provide better secrecy rate performance. At this point, we should mention
that the combined d.o.f. of Eves is
∑K
k=1Ne,k = 9, which is higher than the transmit d.o.f. Nt = 5. The
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rates versus (a) the number of transmit antennas with (Ne,k,K) = (3, 3), and (b) the number of Eves with
(Nt, Ne,k) = (5, 3).
insufficient transmit d.o.f. to deal with Eves is the reason for the unsatisfactory performance of the no-AN
SRM design. To verify this, we plot the secrecy rate versus the number of transmit antennas Nt and the
number of Eves K in Fig. 3(a) and (b), respectively. The sum power is fixed at P = 15dB. From Fig. 3(a)
we can see that the secrecy rate of the no-AN SRM design increases with Nt and approaches that of AN-
aided SRM design for large Nt; this implies that if the transmitter has sufficiently large d.o.f., we need
little or no AN. On the other hand, from Fig. 3(b) we can see that the secrecy rate of the no-AN SRM
design drops rapidly with K. In comparison, the AN-aided SRM design yields superior performance,
even for the case of K = 6 (which corresponds to an Eves’ combined d.o.f. of ∑Kk=1Ne,k = 18). Hence,
the simulation results in Fig. 3(a) and (b) further confirm that incorporating AN in the transmit design
is a powerful means to combat the d.o.f. bottleneck.
B. Example 2: Secrecy Rate Performance with Additional Interference Temperature Constraints
This example considers SRM design with additional interference temperature constraints (ITCs). The
simulation settings are the same as the previous, namely, Nt = 5, Ne,k = 3 for all k, K = 3, and there
is one primary user with two receive antennas, i.e., L = 1, Np,1 = 2. The primary user’s channel R is
generated from a standard complex Gaussian distribution. The ITC level is set to ρ = 5dB; cf. Eq. (6).
The proposed AN-aided SRM design is benchmarked against the no-AN SRM design; see [37]. The
isotropic AN design is not applicable here since it was not designed under ITC constraints. Fig. 4 shows
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the simulation results. We can see that the proposed AN-aided SRM design offers better secrecy rate
performance, especially when P is large.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rates versus the sum power with the interference temperature constraint ρ = 5dB.
C. Example 3: Secrecy Rate Performance under Imperfect CSI
In this last example, our aim is to illustrate the robustness of the WCR-SRM and OCR-SRM designs
(Section IV) when there are uncertainties with Eves’ CSI. The simulation settings are as follows: Nt = 5,
K = 3, Ne,k = 3, sum power constraint only, i.i.d. complex Gaussian generated h and G¯k.
Fig. 5(a) shows the performance of the various designs under the worst-case robust scenario. We set
εk = 0.2 for all k. The performance measure used is the worst-case secrecy rate, which is the objective
function of the WCR-SRM problem in (18). Notice that for a given design (W,Σ), the worst-case
secrecy rate does not have a closed form. In the simulation, we computed the worst-case secrecy rates of
the various designs by using the WCR-SRM optimization method derived in Section IV-A (specifically,
solving (24) with (W,Σ) fixing to be a given design); hence the development there serves a dual purpose
of enabling worst-case secrecy rate computations. In the legend of Fig. 5(a), “no-AN WCR-SRM” is the
no-AN worst-case robust SRM design in [15], and “nonrobust AN-aided SRM” refers to the AN-aided
SRM design in Section III, where we apply the presumed CSIs h, G¯1, . . . , G¯K (rather than the true ones)
to perform the transmit design in the simulations and then evaluate the resultant worst-case secrecy rate.
From Fig. 5(a), we can see that nonrobust AN-aided SRM is sensitive to CSI uncertainties. Specifically,
for P ≥ 15dB, nonrobust AN-aided SRM exhibits performance degradation that tends to worsen as P
increases. Moreover, the proposed AN-aided WCR-SRM design achieves the best worst-case secrecy rate
August 21, 2018 DRAFT
21
performance compared to the other designs.
We turn our attention to the outage-constrained robust scenario. We set δ = 1% and σk = 0.05 for all
k. The performance measure used this time is the outage-constrained secrecy rate; Monte Carlo-based
evaluation was used to compute the outage-constrained secrecy rates of the considered designs. Fig. 5(b)
shows the outage-constrained secrecy rates of the various designs. The results are generally consistent
with their worst-case robust counterparts in Fig. 5(a), with one difference. Specifically, nonrobust AN-
aided SRM is seen to yield slightly better outage-constrained secrecy rate performance than AN-aided
OCR-SRM for P ≤ 20dB. The reason is that the method for AN-aided OCR-SRM (see Section IV-B) is a
safe approximation. Nevertheless, nonrobust AN-aided SRM possesses the same performance degradation
behavior as in the worst-case scenario, and AN-aided OCR-SRM (by safe approximation) generally yields
the best outage-constrained secrecy rate performance.
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Fig. 5. (a) Worst-case secrecy rates versus the sum power P ; (b) outage secrecy rates versus the sum power P .
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper has considered the AN-aided secrecy rate maximization problem for an MISO channel
overheard by multiple multi-antenna Eves and under both perfect and imperfect CSI. The SRM problem
is challenging to solve due to its intrinsically complex problem structures. By resorting to an SDP-based
optimization approach, we show that the SRM problem and its worst-case robust generalization can be
efficiently handled by solving a sequence of SDPs. Moreover, the development itself indicates that transmit
beamforming is generally an optimal strategy for the confidential information transmission. In addition,
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we also propose a safe approximation to an outage-constrained robust SRM problem by using worst-case
robust SRM. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed designs can achieve better performance
than the optimal SRM design without AN and the design with isotropic AN, especially when the number
of Eves is large. These observations confirm the efficacy of AN in enhancing transmission security, as
well as the necessity of optimizing AN in order to effectively interfere Eves.
As briefly mentioned in introduction, several existing AN-aided physical-layer secrecy approaches [3]–
[8], [13], [16], [17] employ a design constraint that AN lies in the nullspace of the legitimate user’s
channel; i.e., hHΣh = 0. This nullspace AN constraint is reasonable, since the use of AN is intended
to interfere the eavesdroppers, but not the legitimate user. Also, using the nullspace AN constraint may
help simplify design and analysis. The AN-aided SRM problem considered here does not incorporate
the nullspace AN constraint, although it is possible to do so—we can add the nullspace AN constraint
to the AN-aided SRM problem (more precisely, problem (4) with an extra constraint hHΣh = 0),
and the resulting problem can be handled by essentially the same SDP-based optimization approach
described in this paper, with some minor modification. We found that the nullspace AN constraint does
not help simplify the optimization of the SRM problem. However, we examined by simulations that the
SRM problem with the nullspace AN constraint can achieve secrecy rate performance quite close to that
without the nullspace AN constraint; the simulation results are not shown here due to the page limit. This
observation suggests that it is sound to consider the nullspace AN constraint. As a future work, it would
be interesting to analyze the SRM-optimal AN solution, studying how close it approaches the nullspace
AN condition.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The idea of the proof is to establish some lower bounds on the left-hand side (LHS) of (9a). First,
note the following equivalence
log det
(
I+
(
I+GHΣG
)−1
GHWG
)
≤ log β (35a)
⇐⇒det
(
I+U−
1
2GHWGU−
1
2
)
≤ β, (35b)
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where U = I + GHΣG. Eq. (35b) is obtained by applying the basic matrix result det(I + AB) =
det(I + BA) to (35a). Moreover, (35b) implies that β ≥ 1. To proceed further, we need the following
lemma, which provides a lower bound on the LHS of (35b).
Lemma 2 ([15]). Let A  0. It holds true that
det(I+A) ≥ 1 + Tr(A), (36)
and that the equality in (36) holds if and only if rank(A) ≤ 1.
Applying Lemma 2 to the LHS of (35b) yields
det
(
I+U−
1
2GHWGU−
1
2
)
≥ 1 + Tr
(
U−
1
2GHWGU−
1
2
)
. (37)
Combining (35) and (37), we get
(35a) =⇒ Tr
(
U−
1
2GHWGU−
1
2
)
≤ β − 1. (38)
In light of U− 12GHWGU− 12  0, and the fact that Tr(A) ≥ λmax(A) holds for any A  0, we have
(35a) =⇒ λmax
(
U−
1
2GHWGU−
1
2
)
≤ β − 1, (39a)
⇐⇒ U−
1
2GHWGU−
1
2  (β − 1)I, (39b)
⇐⇒ (β − 1)U  GHWG, (39c)
as desired. As for the equivalence part of Proposition 1, we verify it as follows. By Lemma 2, the equality
in (37) holds if rank(W) ≤ 1. This is because rank(W) ≤ 1 implies rank(U− 12GHWGU− 12 ) ≤ 1
and thus the equality condition in Lemma 2 holds. Next we show that (39a) also implies the right-hand
side of (38) when rank(W) ≤ 1. By the following fact
A  0, rank(A) ≤ 1⇐⇒ A = aaH for some vector a,
we have U−
1
2GHWGU−
1
2 = wwH for some vector w ∈ CNt . Therefore, (39a) can be re-expressed as
λmax(ww
H) ≤ (β−1), which is equivalent to the right-hand side of (38) by noting that λmax(wwH) =
Tr(wwH).
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B. Proof of Theorem 1
For ease of exposition, we recall the SRM problem (8) and its relaxed problem (10), which are
respectively given by
R⋆ = max
β≥1


max
W0,Σ0
log
(
1+hH(W+Σ)h
β(1+hHΣh)
)
s.t. log det
(
I+
(
I+GHk ΣGk
)−1
GHk WGk
)
≤ log β, ∀k ∈ K
Tr(W +Σ) ≤ P, Tr(Φl (W+Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L,


(40)
and
R¯⋆ = max
β≥1


max
W0,Σ0
log
(
1+hH(W+Σ)h
β(1+hHΣh)
)
s.t. (β − 1)(I +GHk ΣGk)−G
H
k WGk  0, ∀k ∈ K
Tr(W +Σ) ≤ P, Tr(Φl (W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L


. (41)
The proof consists of two steps: First, we show that for any given feasible β, there exists an optimal
W for the inner maximization problem of (41) such that rank(W) ≤ 1; second, we show that such a
W is also optimal for the inner maximization problem of (40), and hence a solution correspondence is
established between Problems (40) and (41).
Step 1: Given a feasible β of (41), let R¯β denote the optimal value of the inner maximization problem
of (41). Consider the following power minimization problem:
min
W0,Σ0
Tr(W +Σ) (42a)
s.t. log
(1 + hH(W +Σ)h
β(1 + hHΣh)
)
≥ R¯β, (42b)
(β − 1)(I +GHk ΣGk) G
H
k WGk, ∀k ∈ K, (42c)
Tr (Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L. (42d)
Here, problem (42) aims to minimize the total transmit power subject to a minimum requirement of the
secrecy rate R¯β . The reason why we consider problem (42) is as follows (we will prove them later):
First, the optimal solution of (42) is also optimal for the inner maximization problem of (41); second, the
optimal solution W of (42) must satisfy rank(W) ≤ 1. Combining the above two claims, the existence
of an optimal W with rank(W) ≤ 1 is readily established for the inner maximization problem of (41).
Let (W¯, Σ¯) and (Wˆ, Σˆ) denote the optimal solutions of the inner maximization problems of (41) and
(42), respectively. One can easily verify that (W¯, Σ¯) is a feasible solution of (42). It follows that
Tr(Wˆ + Σˆ) ≤ Tr(W¯ + Σ¯) ≤ P, (43)
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where the first inequality is due to the fact that (Wˆ, Σˆ) minimizes Tr(Wˆ+ Σˆ) (cf. Problem (42a)); the
second inequality follows from the feasibility of (W¯, Σ¯) w.r.t. (41). The inequality (43), together with
(42d), imply that (Wˆ, Σˆ) is a feasible solution of (41), i.e.,
log
(
1 + hH(Wˆ + Σˆ)h
β(1 + hHΣˆh)
)
≤ R¯β . (44)
Combining (44) with (42b) yields
log
(
1 + hH(Wˆ + Σˆ)h
β(1 + hHΣˆh)
)
= R¯β.
Therefore, (Wˆ, Σˆ) is an optimal solution of the inner maximization problem of (41).
To show rank(Wˆ) ≤ 1, we check the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions of prob-
lem (42). Let us rewrite (42) as
min
W0,Σ0
Tr(W +Σ) (45a)
s.t. hH (W + µΣ)h+ µ ≥ 0, (45b)
Tk(W,Σ)  0, Tr (Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀k, l, (45c)
where µ = 1 − β2R¯β , and Tk(W,Σ) , (β − 1)(I +GHk ΣGk) −GHk WGk, ∀k. The Lagrangian of
problem (45) is given by
L(X ) =Tr(W +Σ) +
∑L
l=1 ηl
(
Tr (Φl(W +Σ))− ρl
)
− λ
(
hH(W + µΣ)h+ µ
)
−
∑K
k=1Tr
(
AkTk(W,Σ)
)
− Tr(QW)− Tr(MΣ),
where X denotes a collection of all the primal and dual variables of problem (45); Q ∈ HNt+ , M ∈ HNt+ ,
λ ∈ R+, Ak ∈ H
Ne,k
+ and ηl ∈ R+ are dual variables associated with W  0, Σ  0, (45b), and
(45c), respectively. Assuming that problem (45) satisfies some constraint qualifications [33], the KKT
conditions that are relevant to the proof are given by
I− λhhH +
∑K
k=1GkAkG
H
k +
∑L
l=1 ηlΦl −Q = 0, (46a)
QW = 0, (46b)
W  0, Ak  0, ∀k, ηl ≥ 0,∀l, (46c)
Postmultiplying (46a) by W and making use of (46b) yield
(
I+
∑K
k=1GkAkG
H
k +
∑L
l=1 ηlΦl
)
W = λhhHW, (47)
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which implies that
rank
(
(I+
∑K
k=1GkAkG
H
k +
∑L
l=1 ηlΦl)W
)
= rank(λhhHW) ≤ 1. (48)
Since I+
∑K
k=1GkAkG
H
k +
∑L
l=1 ηlΦl ≻ 0, the following relation holds
rank(W) = rank
(
(I+
∑K
k=1GkAkG
H
k +
∑L
l=1 ηlΦl)W
)
. (49)
Finally, using (48) and (49) produces the desired result rank(W) ≤ 1.
Step 2: Let φβ(W,Σ) be the objective function of the inner maximization problem of (40) (or problem
(41)) for a particular β, and (W˘, Σ˘) and (W¯, Σ¯) be the corresponding optimal solutions of the inner
maximization problem of (40) and (41), respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume rank(W¯) ≤ 1.
Since the inner maximization problem of (41) is a relaxation of that of (40) (cf. Proposition 1), we have
φβ(W¯, Σ¯) ≥ φβ(W˘, Σ˘).
On the other hand, the condition rank(W¯) ≤ 1 implies that (W¯, Σ¯) is also a feasible solution of the
inner maximization problem of (40), owing to the equivalence condition in Proposition 1. As a result,
we have
φβ(W¯, Σ¯) ≤ φβ(W˘, Σ˘).
Combining the above two inequalities, we conclude that φβ(W¯, Σ¯) = φβ(W˘, Σ˘), i.e., (W¯, Σ¯) is also
optimal for the inner maximization problem of (40).
We have established a solution correspondence between (40) and (41) for any given feasible β, which
includes the optimal β⋆. Subsequently, the results in Theorem 1 are obtained.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is reminiscent of Theorem 1. Re-express (24) as
R¯⋆ = max
β≥1


max
W,Σ,{tk}
log
(
1 + hH(W +Σ)h
β(1 + hHΣh)
)
s.t. Tk(β,W,Σ, tk)  0, tk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,
Tr (Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L,
Tr(W +Σ) ≤ P, W  0, Σ  0


(50)
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Given a feasible β of (50), let R¯β denote the optimal value of the inner maximization problem of (50).
Consider the following secrecy-rate constrained power minimization problem
min
W0,Σ0,t1,...,tK
Tr(W +Σ)
s.t. log
(1 + hH(W +Σ)h
β(1 + hHΣh)
)
≥ R¯β,
Tk(β,W,Σ, tk)  0, tk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,
Tr (Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L.
(51)
Following the same argument in the proof of Theorem 1, one can easily verify that the optimal solution
of (51) must be optimal for the inner maximization problem of (50). Next, we show that the optimal
solution of (51) has a rank no greater than one by checking its KKT conditions. Rewrite (51) as
min
W,Σ,{tk}k∈K
Tr(W +Σ) (52a)
s.t. hH(W + µΣ)h+ µ ≥ 0, (52b)
G˜Hk ((β − 1)Σ −W) G˜k +

(β − 1− tk)I 0
0 tkǫ2k
I

  0, tk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K (52c)
Tr (Φl(W +Σ)) ≤ ρl, ∀l ∈ L, (52d)
W  0, Σ  0, (52e)
where µ = 1− 2R¯ββ and G˜k = [ G¯k, I ]. The Lagrangian of problem (52) is given by
L(X ) = Tr(W +Σ)−
∑K
k=1Tr(AkTk(β,W,Σ, tk))
+
∑L
l=1 ηl (Tr (Φl(W +Σ))− ρl)− Tr(ΣM)
−Tr(WQ)− ν
(
hH(W + µΣ)h+ µ
)
−
∑K
k=1 λktk,
where X denotes a collection of all primal and dual variables; Q ∈ HNt+ , M ∈ HNt+ , ν ∈ R+, Ak ∈
H
Ne,k+Nt
+ , λk ∈ R+,∀k and ηl ∈ R+,∀l are dual variables associated with W, Σ, (52b), (52c) and (52d),
respectively. Parts of the KKT conditions of problem (52) are listed below:
I+
K∑
k=1
G˜kAkG˜
H
k +
L∑
l=1
ηlΦl − νhh
H −Q = 0, (53a)
QW = 0, (53b)
W  0, Q  0, Ak  0,∀k ∈ K, ηl ≥ 0,∀l ∈ L, (53c)
Postmultiplying (53a) by W and making use of (53b), we obtain
(I+
∑K
k=1 G˜kAkG˜
H
k +
∑L
l=1 ηlΦl)W = νhh
HW,
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which implies that
rank
((
I+
∑K
k=1 G˜kAkG˜
H
k +
∑L
l=1 ηlΦl
)
W
)
= rank(νhhHW) ≤ 1. (54)
Since I+
∑K
k=1 G˜kAkG˜
H
k +
∑L
l=1 ηlΦl ≻ 0, it holds that
rank(W) = rank
(
(I+
∑K
k=1 G˜kAkG˜
H
k +
∑L
l=1 ηlΦl)W
)
. (55)
Combining (55) and (54) yields rank(W) ≤ 1.
To complete the proof, we still need to argue that such an optimal W is also optimal for (19) for the
same β. The proof is essentially identical to that of Theorem 1, and thus is omitted for brevity.
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